MEMORANDUM OF ADVICE

MATTER: Quilter & Richards v Gandfors Pty Ltd & Anor PROCEEDING: Supreme Court of Queensland — BS 1849/26 FROM: BossLawyerAI, Boss Lawyers Pty Ltd TO: Mark Harley, Principal DATE: 1 May 2026 RE: Defence Assessment, Limitation Analysis and Case Law Research STATUS: Privileged & Confidential — Legal Professional Privilege Applies CLASSIFICATION: Working memorandum — suitable for briefing counsel

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 We act for the First Defendant, Gandfors Pty Ltd ACN 104 477 250 in its capacity as trustee for the G & G Trust ("Trustee"), and for the Second Defendant, Alf Evert Roger Gandfors ("Alf"). The Plaintiffs, Louisa Anne Quilter and Michael William Richards (together, the "Plaintiffs"), are the adult step-children of Alf and the children of his late wife, Megan Gandfors (deceased 12 October 2012).

1.2 The Plaintiffs claim equitable compensation of $812,588.26 plus interest under s 58 Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld) for breaches of trust said to have occurred in financial years 2004 to 2013 inclusive. They allege that trust income was "distributed" to them on paper (and on which they paid income tax), but that the cash was instead paid to Alf and Megan personally — a sum said to total $1,052,952.80.

1.3 The proceeding was filed on 30 April 2026. The most recent breach is alleged to have occurred at 30 June 2013 — almost 13 years before the claim was issued. The earliest is almost 22 years old. Limitation is the central issue.

1.4 Overall defence merit: 7/10. The defence is strong on limitation, on the absence of any trustee determination giving rise to present entitlement, and on laches. The principal risk is that the Court characterises the conduct as "fraudulent breach of trust" within s 27(1)(a) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) ("LAA"), in which case no statutory period applies. The equity (in a non-technical sense) lies with the Plaintiffs: they paid tax on money they did not receive.

1.5 We recommend: (a) immediate filing of the Notice of Intention to Defend; (b) a careful review of the trust deed's determination and accumulation provisions; (c) that consideration be given to a strike-out / summary judgment application under UCPR r 171 or r 292; and (d) early reference to counsel and exploration of a Calderbank offer as a hedge against the residual fraud risk.

2. PROCEDURAL POSTURE

2.1 The Statement of Claim ("SOC") was filed on 30 April 2026 in BS 1849/26 and served on 1 May 2026. Critical dates:

NOI (UCPR r 137): due 29 May 2026.

Defence (UCPR r 137): due 26 June 2026 (28 days from service).

Any application to strike out (r 171) or for summary judgment (r 292) should be foreshadowed in the Defence (or a discrete interlocutory application filed before defence).

2.2 The matter has prior procedural history:

28 January 2026: demand letter from Merton Lawyers to Alf.

30 January 2026: first response and advice provided to Alf.

4 February 2026: Merton escalation.

18 February 2026: originating application filed in OA 698/26 seeking preliminary disclosure under UCPR r 208D.

20 February 2026: our letter resisting the breadth of the disclosure sought.

10 March 2026: consent adjournment of 11 March hearing to 25 March 2026.

20 March 2026: Deputy Registrar's costs order.

30 April 2026: SOC filed in BS 1849/26.

2.3 The preliminary disclosure proceeding (OA 698/26) and any costs order will need to be reconciled with the present claim. We will need to confirm whether OA 698/26 has been discontinued or remains on foot.

3. THE FACTS RELEVANT TO DEFENCE

3.1 The Trust

3.1.1 The G & G Trust was established by deed dated 28 April 2003. The trustee since establishment has been Gandfors Pty Ltd. The deed and constitution have been located and produced.

3.1.2 The Plaintiffs are named as both Income Beneficiaries and Corpus Beneficiaries. They are not the only beneficiaries; Alf, Megan and the Gandfors children are also beneficiaries (subject to the precise terms of the deed, which require close construction).

3.1.3 Directorships of the Trustee:

Alf — sole director since 22 April 2003 (continuing).

Megan — co-director until 5 June 2013 (notwithstanding her death on 12 October 2012; the late notification to ASIC is a factual matter to investigate, not a substantive issue).

Michael Richards — recorded on the ASIC register as director from 5 June 2013 to 18 October 2018 (some 5 years 4 months). Michael's affidavit (filed in OA 698/26) deposes that he did not consent to and did not know of the appointment.

3.2 The Allegations of Distribution

3.2.1 For each of FY2004 to FY2013, the Plaintiffs were named in the Trustee's tax returns as presently entitled to specified amounts of trust income. The cumulative figures alleged are:

Plaintiff	Total allocated	Total paid	Total claimed
Louisa Quilter	$498,249.00	$6,554.00	$491,695.00
Michael Richards	$340,455.00	$19,561.74	$320,893.26
TOTAL	$838,704.00	$26,115.74	$812,588.26

3.2.2 The Plaintiffs lodged personal income tax returns on the footing of present entitlement and paid income tax on the allocated amounts. The cash differential — said to be $1,052,952.80 — was paid from the Trustee's ANZ account to Alf and Megan personally, on the Plaintiffs' case.

3.3 The Records (or Lack of Them)

3.3.1 No trustee resolutions have been located for FY2004 to FY2013.

3.3.2 No financial statements or trust accounts have been located beyond what can be reconstructed from bank statements and lodged tax returns.

3.3.3 The accountant — David Coomber of Coomber & Co — prepared both the Trust returns and the Plaintiffs' personal returns. Coomber & Co has closed and Mr Coomber is, on present information, unreachable.

3.3.4 ANZ statements (2006–2013) have been located. They corroborate payments to Alf and Megan but do not, in themselves, establish what those payments were for (loan repayments, drawings against capital, gifts, etc.).

3.3.5 The Plaintiffs claim they only became aware in November 2025, when Louisa undertook ASIC and ATO checks.

3.4 The Newstead Property

3.4.1 In 2021, a Newstead property was purchased for $741,000 cash in the names of Alf and his daughter Ashleigh. The Plaintiffs may seek to argue this is traceable to misappropriated trust funds. The temporal disconnect (8–18 years between the alleged breaches and the purchase) and the absence of the Trustee company on title are significant obstacles to any tracing claim.

4. ISSUE 1 — LIMITATION (THE PRIMARY DEFENCE)

4.1 The Statutory Framework

4.1.1 Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), s 27 provides (relevantly):

27 Limitations of actions in respect of trust property

(1) No period of limitation prescribed by this Act shall apply to an action by a beneficiary under a trust, being an action—

(a) in respect of any fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which the trustee was a party or privy; or

(b) to recover from the trustee trust property or the proceeds thereof in the possession of the trustee, or previously received by the trustee and converted to the trustee's use.

(2) Subject to subsection (1), an action by a beneficiary to recover trust property or in respect of any breach of trust, not being an action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by any other provision of this Act, shall not be brought after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the right of action accrued.

(3) … the right of action shall not be deemed to have accrued to any beneficiary entitled to a future interest in the trust property until the interest fell into possession.

4.1.2 The interaction of s 27 with the equitable doctrines of laches, acquiescence and delay is preserved by s 43 of the LAA, which provides that nothing in the Act affects "any equitable jurisdiction to refuse relief on the ground of acquiescence, laches or otherwise".

4.2 Section 27(2) — The Six-Year Period

4.2.1 The default position is a 6-year period running from accrual of the cause of action.

4.2.2 Accrual. A beneficiary's cause of action for breach of trust accrues when the breach occurs, not when it is discovered: Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539 at 588; Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria [2014] AC 1189 at [9]. Where the breach consists in failing to account to a beneficiary for trust income to which the beneficiary is presently entitled, the cause of action accrues when payment ought to have been made. On the Plaintiffs' case, that is at the latest at the close of each relevant financial year (or when distributions were made to others).

4.2.3 Application: The latest alleged breach is in FY2013 (year ended 30 June 2013). Six years from 30 June 2013 is 30 June 2019. The earliest is FY2004, expiring 30 June 2010. Proceedings were filed on 30 April 2026 — at least 6 years and 10 months out of time for the most recent breach, and almost 16 years out of time for the earliest.

4.2.4 If s 27(2) applies, the entire claim is statute-barred.

4.3 Section 27(1)(a) — Fraud or Fraudulent Breach of Trust

4.3.1 This is the Plaintiffs' principal escape route. They will plead that Alf, as the directing mind of the Trustee, knowingly directed trust income to himself and Megan in breach of the Plaintiffs' beneficial interest, and that this constitutes "fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which the trustee was a party or privy".

4.3.2 The meaning of "fraud" in this context. "Fraud" for the purposes of s 27(1)(a) is not constructive fraud; it requires actual dishonesty. The leading authority is Armitage v Nurse [1998] Ch 241, where Millett LJ held (at 251):

"fraud" in this context connotes at the minimum an intention on the part of the trustee to pursue a particular course of action, either knowing that it is contrary to the interests of the beneficiaries or being recklessly indifferent whether it is contrary to their interests or not.

4.3.3 Armitage v Nurse has been consistently applied in Australia: see, e.g., Macks v Viscariello [2017] SASCFC 172; Permanent Building Society (in liq) v Wheeler (1994) 11 WAR 187; Streeter v Western Areas Exploration Pty Ltd (No 2) (2011) 278 ALR 291.

4.3.4 Other key authorities:

Thorne v Heard [1895] AC 495 (HL) — confirms that "fraud" in trustee limitation provisions means actual dishonesty, not equitable fraud.

Gwembe Valley Development Co Ltd v Koshy (No 3) [2003] EWCA Civ 1048; [2004] 1 BCLC 131 — director who concealed personal profit from his company held to have committed fraudulent breach of fiduciary duty; useful for the contrary (Plaintiffs') argument.

Paragon Finance plc v DB Thakerar & Co [1999] 1 All ER 400 — the distinction between Class 1 (express) and Class 2 (constructive) trustees, and the application of s 21 Limitation Act 1980 (UK) (the analogue of s 27 LAA).

Cattley v Pollard [2006] EWHC 3130 (Ch); [2007] Ch 353 — explored the application of the "fraud" exception to dishonest assistants.

Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria [2014] UKSC 10; [2014] AC 1189 — the UK Supreme Court restricted s 21(1)(a) to true trustees, not strangers liable as constructive trustees.

4.3.5 Application to our case (in defence):

(a) The Trustee company acted through its directors (principally Alf). The "directing mind" doctrine is well-settled: Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153; Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission [1995] 2 AC 500.

(b) Even if Alf's conduct is attributed to the Trustee, the question remains whether that conduct was dishonest in the Armitage v Nurse sense.

(c) We will run the following:

Reliance on accountant: Alf relied on Coomber, who designed and implemented the trust distribution practice. This was, on Alf's instructions, a tax-driven scheme — common in family trust practice — and not (in Alf's mind) a misappropriation of beneficial interests.

No concealment: the distributions were openly recorded in tax returns lodged with the ATO and signed by the Plaintiffs themselves. There is no concealment, no false books, no covert dealing — the hallmarks of fraud are absent.

No subjective dishonesty: Alf understood the practice (rightly or wrongly) as routine tax planning. He did not subjectively appreciate that he was misappropriating money belonging to Louisa and Michael.

The Plaintiffs' own conduct: by signing tax returns reflecting their entitlements, the Plaintiffs themselves participated in the very arrangement they now characterise as fraud.

(d) Risk: A judge may take the view that knowingly directing money to yourself when others are presently entitled to it is, by its nature, dishonest. The Plaintiffs will deploy Gwembe Valley and Armitage in their favour, arguing that "recklessly indifferent" is enough. The risk is real and is the principal reason the overall risk rating is 5/10.

4.3.6 Pleading point: Fraud must be specifically and particularised pleaded: UCPR r 150(1)(b); Banque Commerciale SA v Akhil Holdings Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 279; Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No 3) [2003] 2 AC 1 at [184]–[186]. We should scrutinise the SOC's fraud allegation rigorously and, if not properly particularised, seek further and better particulars or strike-out.

4.4 Section 27(1)(b) — Recovery of Trust Property

4.4.1 The provision is engaged where the action is to recover from the trustee:

(i) trust property or its proceeds in the possession of the trustee; or (ii) trust property previously received by the trustee and converted to the trustee's use.

4.4.2 The leading Queensland authority is Menegazzo v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2016] QSC 94 (Applegarth J). Applegarth J carefully distinguished between proprietary claims to recover identifiable trust property (or its traceable proceeds) presently held by the trustee, and personal money claims for compensation. The provision (s 27(1)(b)) is directed at the former. Applegarth J's reasoning at [256]–[280] (and following) is critical and we should ensure counsel has it in mind.

4.4.3 English analogues:

JJ Harrison (Properties) Ltd v Harrison [2002] 1 BCLC 162 — director who took company property liable as trustee under s 21(1)(b) UK Limitation Act 1980.

Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria [2014] AC 1189 — re-affirmed that s 21(1)(b) only applies to true trustees holding (or having received) the very property.

4.4.4 Application:

(a) The SOC seeks "equitable compensation or alternatively equitable damages" — a personal money claim. It is not a proprietary claim for an identifiable fund or asset. That much is clear.

(b) The cash was disbursed to Alf and Megan personally between 2004 and 2013. It is not in the Trustee's possession and has not been so for at least 13 years.

(c) "Converted to the trustee's use": the cash was not applied for the Trustee company's own benefit. Gandfors Pty Ltd (the corporate trustee) did not retain or use the funds. The Plaintiffs' case is that the funds went to Alf and Megan as natural persons. There is a strong argument that this is conversion to Alf's use, not the Trustee's use. The Trustee is a separate legal person from its director: Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22.

(d) The Newstead property is in Alf and Ashleigh's names (not the Trustee's), purchased in 2021 with cash that, even on the Plaintiffs' best case, cannot now be traced through bank accounts active 8–18 years earlier. Tracing requires identification of the property at each stage: Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102; Brady v Stapleton (1952) 88 CLR 322. The trail will have run cold.

4.4.5 Conclusion on s 27(1)(b): The provision should not apply. The claim is a personal compensation claim for funds long since disbursed to a third party (Alf), not held by the Trustee.

4.5 Section 38 — Postponement for Fraud or Concealment

4.5.1 LAA s 38(1) postpones the running of time where:

(a) the action is based on the fraud of the defendant or his agent; or (b) the right of action is concealed by the fraud of any such person; or (c) the action is for relief from the consequences of mistake.

Time runs from when the plaintiff "has discovered the fraud or the mistake or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it."

4.5.2 The Plaintiffs will plead s 38 in the alternative to s 27(1)(a). The reasonable-diligence test is significant:

Paragon Finance plc v DB Thakerar & Co [1999] 1 All ER 400 at 418 (Millett LJ): "reasonable diligence" requires the plaintiff to act as "an adventurous claimant".

Doundoulakis v Constantinou [2010] NSWSC 622 — the test is objective and presumes a degree of curiosity and follow-up.

4.5.3 Application — discoverability cuts against the Plaintiffs:

(a) The Plaintiffs each year signed tax returns showing trust income said to be presently entitled to them. They paid income tax on those amounts. Any reasonably diligent person would, on receiving an annual ATO assessment for tax on income they had not received, ask the obvious question: "Where is the money?"

(b) Louisa was an adult throughout (born 1985 — age 19 in FY2004, age 28 in FY2013). Michael was an adult from FY2009 onwards (born 1990 — age 14 in FY2004, age 23 in FY2013). They (or at least their parents acting through them while minors) signed those returns.

(c) Michael's circumstances are even more difficult: he was a director of the Trustee from 5 June 2013 to 18 October 2018. As a director, he is fixed with the means of knowledge of the company's books (whether or not he chose to inspect): Permanent Building Society v Wheeler (1994) 11 WAR 187; ss 198F and 290 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).

(d) The Plaintiffs' own pleaded case — discovery in November 2025 — is fragile in light of these annual ATO touchpoints over 10 years.

4.6 Laches, Acquiescence and Delay

4.6.1 Equity provides its own defences regardless of statute: LAA s 43; Orr v Ford (1989) 167 CLR 316 at 341 (Deane J).

4.6.2 The classic statement is Lindsay Petroleum Co v Hurd (1874) LR 5 PC 221 at 239–240:

Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.

4.6.3 See also:

Erlanger v New Sombrero Phosphate Co (1878) 3 App Cas 1218.

Orr v Ford (1989) 167 CLR 316 — the High Court emphasised the dual considerations of delay and prejudice.

Crawley v Short [2009] NSWCA 410 — application to long-running family/trust disputes.

Fitzgerald v Masters (1956) 95 CLR 420 — acquiescence requires knowledge of the rights asserted.

Hourigan v Trustees, Executors & Agency Co Ltd (1934) 51 CLR 619.

4.6.4 Application:

(a) Delay: 13–22 years between the alleged breaches and the commencement of proceedings.

(b) Forensic prejudice:

Megan Gandfors is dead (since 2012). She was a co-director of the Trustee for the relevant years and the Plaintiffs' biological parent. She is the single most important witness lost.

David Coomber, the accountant who prepared the returns, is unreachable; his firm has closed.

Coomber & Co's records may have been destroyed (commonly, accountants retain records for 7 years).

Trustee resolutions, working papers, and correspondence from FY2004–FY2013 are not available.

ANZ retains statements only from 2006 — earlier statements are not available; the bank's microfiche / archive position will need confirmation.

(c) Acquiescence: the Plaintiffs signed tax returns each year acknowledging they were income beneficiaries of the Trust. They benefited (in tax credits and franking, where applicable) and took no objection. Acquiescence requires knowledge (Fitzgerald v Masters); the question of imputed knowledge from signed documents is live.

4.6.5 The forensic prejudice is real and acute. This is a textbook case for laches.

4.7 Limitation — Conclusion

4.7.1 Subject only to the s 27(1)(a) "fraud" risk, the limitation defence is strong:

Provision	Outcome
s 27(2) (6 years)	All claims time-barred (6 years exceeded by between 6 years 10 months and 16 years)
s 27(1)(a) (fraud)	Real risk; live battleground
s 27(1)(b) (trust property)	Should not apply — personal money claim, no funds with trustee, no traceable proceeds
s 38 (concealment)	Should not assist Plaintiffs given annual tax-return touchpoints
Laches / acquiescence	Strong

4.7.2 Strength rating: 8/10.

5. ISSUE 2 — TRUST DEED CONSTRUCTION: NO VALID DETERMINATION

5.1 The Point

5.1.1 The SOC alleges that the Trustee "decided to distribute" income for each of FY2004 to FY2013. No trustee resolution has been located for any of those years.

5.1.2 If the trust deed requires a determination by the Trustee in a specified manner (typically a resolution in writing, executed before 30 June each year) for income to be distributed to a particular beneficiary, then in the absence of such a determination there is no present entitlement. The income would either accumulate (if the deed permits) or be held on default trusts.

5.1.3 In either case, the Plaintiffs' core thesis — that they were "presently entitled" to specified amounts of income — fails. They never acquired a beneficial interest in those amounts.

5.2 The Authorities on Present Entitlement

5.2.1 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Bamford (2010) 240 CLR 481 — the High Court confirmed that "income of the trust estate" for s 97(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) is determined by reference to the trust deed. "Present entitlement" requires a vested and indefeasible interest in possession.

5.2.2 Harmer v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 173 CLR 264 — present entitlement requires the beneficiary to have an interest that is "vested both in interest and in possession" and have a present legal right to demand payment.

5.2.3 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Thomas (2018) 264 CLR 177 (and Thomas v FCT (1972) 3 ATR 165) — the constitutive document is the trust deed; tax characterisation does not create equitable rights.

5.2.4 Pearson v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2006) 232 ALR 55 — distributions outside the deed's distributive mechanism are ineffective.

5.2.5 Colonial First State Investments Ltd v FCT (2011) 192 FCR 298 — emphasised the formal requirements of trust deeds and the consequences of non-compliance.

5.2.6 Re BPTC Ltd (in liq) (No 3) (1992) 7 ACSR 291 — accounting entries are not a substitute for trustee action.

5.2.7 Vacuum Oil Co Pty Ltd v Wiltshire (1945) 72 CLR 319 — entries in books of account do not bind, in the absence of substantive transactions.

5.3 Application

5.3.1 We need to verify, by close reading of the G & G Trust deed, the following matters:

(a) Default income clause: what happens to income that is not the subject of a valid determination by the relevant time? Typically, deeds provide either for (i) accumulation, or (ii) distribution to default beneficiaries.

(b) Form of determination: does the deed require a written resolution? Signed and dated when (typically before 30 June)?

(c) Income accumulation power: is there an accumulation power, and if so, does it have temporal limits?

(d) Definition of "income": is income trust law income or s 95 net income? Post-Bamford deeds often include drafting addressing this.

5.3.2 The accountant's tax returns are not trustee resolutions. Coomber & Co's preparation of the Trust's tax return naming the Plaintiffs as beneficiaries entitled to specified amounts is not an act of the Trustee. The Trustee acts through its director(s) by formal resolution: Australian Securities Commission v AS Nominees Ltd (1995) 62 FCR 504; Re Macquarie Pacific Funding Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1247.

5.3.3 If no valid determination was ever made, the Plaintiffs:

(a) had no present entitlement; (b) had no equitable interest in the relevant income; (c) have no claim in equity for compensation for the non-payment of income to which they were not entitled; and (d) the proper remedy, if any, is to amend their tax returns (subject to ATO time-limits — generally now well out of time under s 170 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) — Pt IVC review etc.).

5.3.4 Caveat: if the deed has a "default beneficiary" clause naming the Plaintiffs (as is common in family trust deeds where the principal/parent is named as default), then absent a valid determination, the income would automatically vest in them under the default trust. In that scenario, the "no determination" argument strengthens the Plaintiffs' position. We must check the deed before running this argument.

5.4 Strength Rating

5.4.1 Subject to the deed, strength rating: 7/10. This argument depends on the precise terms of the deed and counsel will need to construe the determination, accumulation and default-beneficiary clauses with care.

6. ISSUE 3 — CHARACTERISATION OF THE CLAIM

6.1 Personal vs Proprietary

6.1.1 The SOC seeks "equitable compensation or alternatively equitable damages". This is a personal monetary remedy, not a proprietary one.

6.1.2 Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns [1996] AC 421 — equitable compensation is the remedy for breach of trust where restoration of the fund is no longer possible.

6.1.3 AIB Group (UK) plc v Mark Redler & Co Solicitors [2014] UKSC 58; [2015] AC 1503 — a unanimous UK Supreme Court adopting Target Holdings: equitable compensation tracks loss caused by the breach.

6.1.4 Youyang Pty Ltd v Minter Ellison Morris Fletcher (2003) 212 CLR 484 — the High Court endorsed equitable compensation as a flexible personal remedy, requiring causation of loss to the trust.

6.1.5 Re Dawson [1966] 2 NSWR 211 — Street J's classic articulation of equitable compensation principles.

6.1.6 Target Holdings (Australia) Pty Ltd v DLTE Pty Ltd [2007] FCAFC 40 — personal remedy character of equitable compensation.

6.1.7 Bofinger v Kingsway Group Ltd (2009) 239 CLR 269 — emphasis on causal connection.

6.2 Why Characterisation Matters Here

6.2.1 If the claim is personal:

(a) it falls under s 27(2) LAA — 6-year limitation; (b) it is not within s 27(1)(b) (which is concerned with property in the Trustee's hands or its proceeds); (c) it is more amenable to laches.

6.2.2 The Plaintiffs may attempt to dress up the claim as proprietary by alleging tracing into the Newstead property. We should resist this:

(a) the Newstead property was purchased in 2021 — 8 years after the latest alleged breach; (b) the property is in Alf's and Ashleigh's names, not the Trustee's; (c) tracing requires identification at each step — bank accounts active in 2004–2013, exhausted, replenished, and exhausted again multiple times since, defeat tracing as a matter of evidence: Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102; Brady v Stapleton (1952) 88 CLR 322; Heperu Pty Ltd v Belle (2009) 76 NSWLR 230.

6.3 Strength Rating

6.3.1 Strength rating: 7/10 that the claim will be characterised as personal and so attract s 27(2).

7. ISSUE 4 — ALF'S PERSONAL LIABILITY

7.1 The Pleaded Basis

7.1.1 The SOC sues Alf personally as Second Defendant. The pleaded basis appears to be:

(a) breach of director's duties at general law and/or under ss 180–184 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (although the latter may be enforceable only by ASIC or the company per s 1317J); (b) knowing receipt of trust property (the first limb of Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244); or (c) knowing assistance in a dishonest and fraudulent design (the second limb of Barnes v Addy).

7.2 Knowing Receipt

7.2.1 The first limb requires:

(a) trust property received in breach of trust; (b) by a stranger to the trust (Alf is not the trustee — the company is); (c) with knowledge that the property was trust property and that it was being transferred in breach of trust.

7.2.2 Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89 — the High Court confirmed that the Baden scale of knowledge categories 1–4 (actual, willfully shutting eyes, willfully and recklessly failing to make inquiries, knowledge of circumstances which would indicate facts to an honest and reasonable person) all suffice for knowing receipt; category 5 (knowledge of circumstances which would put an honest and reasonable person on inquiry) is not enough.

7.2.3 Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) (2012) 200 FCR 296 — Full Federal Court useful synthesis of knowing receipt.

7.2.4 Application: Alf, as the directing mind of the Trustee and the recipient of the funds, plainly had knowledge of where the money came from. Knowing receipt is the most likely route to personal liability.

7.3 Knowing Assistance

7.3.1 Requires a dishonest and fraudulent design by the trustee plus assistance with knowledge: Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan [1995] 2 AC 378; Farah Constructions. The dishonesty requirement here is essentially identical to the s 27(1)(a) fraud question — and so this limb rises and falls with that issue.

7.4 Director's Duties

7.4.1 Civil penalty provisions under ss 180–184 are enforceable only by ASIC: s 1317J. There is no private right of action for breach of the statutory provisions. The Plaintiffs' route for relief is the corresponding general law duties: Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41; ASIC v Cassimatis (No 8) (2016) 336 ALR 209.

7.4.2 But: a director ordinarily owes duties to the company, not directly to beneficiaries of a trust of which the company is trustee — although in narrow circumstances a director may owe duties direct: Hurley v BGH Nominees Pty Ltd (1982) 1 ACLC 387; Young v Murphy [1996] 1 VR 279. This is a contestable area.

7.5 Limitation Position for Alf

7.5.1 If Alf is liable as a knowing recipient, he is treated as a constructive trustee. Following Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria [2014] AC 1189, he is a "Class 2" constructive trustee — i.e. not a true trustee — and so:

(a) section 27(1)(a) and (b) LAA do not apply to him at all (per Williams); and (b) the ordinary 6-year period for actions on a tort or based on simple contract (s 10 LAA) or for equitable claims (s 10(6), or s 27(2) by analogy under Knox v Gye (1872) LR 5 HL 656) applies.

7.5.2 In that scenario, Alf's limitation defence is even stronger than the Trustee's — he is not within the s 27(1)(a) "fraud" exception at all.

7.5.3 The contrary view is that Williams should not be followed in Queensland. We will need to address whether Williams has been adopted in Australia. Hasler v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd (2014) 87 NSWLR 609 (Leeming JA) discussed but did not finally resolve the point. Magyar Sales (Aust) Pty Ltd v Magyar [2017] NSWSC 1469 also relevant.

7.6 Strength Rating

7.6.1 The claim against Alf personally is exposed at multiple points: characterisation under Barnes v Addy, the limitation point under Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria, and the dishonesty requirement.

8. ISSUE 5 — MICHAEL RICHARDS: CREDIBILITY AND DIRECTORSHIP

8.1 The Inconsistencies

8.1.1 Michael's affidavit (filed in OA 698/26):

says he received nothing — yet the SOC admits $19,561.74 was paid to him;

says he did not consent to being a director — yet ASIC records show him as a director from 5 June 2013 to 18 October 2018 (5 years and 4 months);

says Alf told him to sign tax returns without reading them — yet he signed them and benefited from the franking credits and other tax outcomes;

says he didn't know he was a beneficiary until November 2025 — yet his tax returns each year showed trust distribution income for which he was assessed.

8.2 Imputed Knowledge as Director

8.2.1 A director is bound by knowledge that he or she could have ascertained from the company's books and records: Permanent Building Society v Wheeler (1994) 11 WAR 187; ASIC Act provisions on records under ss 286 and 290 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (right of director to inspect books).

8.2.2 The fact of directorship — whether or not he actively performed duties — undermines any case that he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered the alleged breaches.

8.3 Credibility

8.3.1 The internal inconsistency between affidavit and SOC (no payments / $19,561.74) goes to credit and we should explore it on cross-examination, but more immediately by RFI seeking particulars of the payments admitted in the SOC and how they are reconciled with Michael's evidence.

8.4 Strength Rating

8.4.1 Strength rating: 6/10. Useful to undermine credibility and to defeat any "reasonable diligence" argument. Won't decide the case but will hurt the Plaintiffs in the witness box.

9. ISSUE 6 — THE ACCOUNTANT'S ROLE

9.1 Reliance on Professional Advice

9.1.1 Alf will say he relied on Coomber's advice as to how distributions should be structured. The "reliance on advice" defence:

(a) is not a complete defence to breach of trust, but it goes to the question of whether the conduct was dishonest (relevant to s 27(1)(a) and to Barnes v Addy knowing assistance); (b) is recognised in AGL Energy Ltd v ACCC (2014) 226 FCR 423; ASIC v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345 (in different statutory contexts).

9.2 Contribution / Concurrent Wrongdoer

9.2.1 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) Pt 2 — proportionate liability applies to claims for "economic loss or damage to property in an action for damages arising from a failure to take reasonable care". Whether equitable compensation falls within "damages" is contested: Selig v Wealthsure Pty Ltd (2015) 255 CLR 661 (different statutory wording); Hudspeth v Scholastic Cleaning and Consultancy Services Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 567.

9.2.2 More productively, Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld) s 6 — contribution between joint and several tortfeasors: would not directly apply to breach of trust, but the Trusts Act 1973 (Qld) s 67 (court-ordered relief from liability for trustees who acted honestly and reasonably) is highly relevant.

9.3 Section 76 Trusts Act 1973 (Qld)

9.3.1 Section 76 provides:

If it appears to the court that a trustee … is or may be personally liable for any breach of trust … but has acted honestly and reasonably, and ought fairly to be excused for the breach of trust and for omitting to obtain the directions of the court in the matter in which the trustee committed the breach, then the court may relieve the trustee either wholly or partly from personal liability for the same.

(NB: practitioners should confirm the precise section number under the Trusts Act 1973 (Qld) — historically s 76, and largely unchanged in the Trusts Act 2025 (Qld) which commences on 28 April 2026.)

9.3.2 Re Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc (No 2) (2008) 237 CLR 66 — guidance on the discretion.

9.3.3 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd (2002) 41 ACSR 343 — application in commercial trusts.

9.3.4 Re Magarey Farlam Lawyers Trust Accounts (No 3) (2007) 96 SASR 337.

9.4 Strength Rating

9.4.1 The accountant's role does not provide a standalone defence but is highly relevant to:

(a) negating subjective dishonesty under s 27(1)(a) and Barnes v Addy; (b) supporting any application for relief under s 76 Trusts Act 1973 (Qld); (c) any contribution claim against Coomber's professional indemnity insurer (if traceable, and the policy run-off cover is alive).

10. OTHER POTENTIAL DEFENCES / ARGUMENTS

10.1 Plaintiffs' Own Conduct — In Pari Delicto / Volenti / Set-Off

10.1.1 The Plaintiffs signed tax returns reflecting trust distributions. They received a tax benefit from this (lower marginal rate / franking credits / family arrangement). It is no answer to say "I did not know what I was signing" — see the line of authority on signed documents: L'Estrange v F Graucob Ltd [1934] 2 KB 394; Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165 (signed documents bind the signatory in the absence of misrepresentation, fraud or non est factum).

10.1.2 Set-off: any amount we are required to pay should be reduced by:

(a) tax credits / refunds the Plaintiffs received because of the franking attached to trust distributions; (b) any amounts paid for the Plaintiffs' benefit (e.g., school fees, living expenses) by Alf or Megan during the period, if substantiated.

10.2 Section 39 LAA — Disability

10.2.1 If the Plaintiffs were under a disability (e.g., minority) when the cause of action accrued, time runs from when the disability ceased: s 5 LAA. Louisa was an adult throughout. Michael was a minor for FY2004–FY2008. Even allowing for that and a 6-year run from his 18th birthday (2008), his time expired in 2014. He is well out of time even on the most generous calculation.

10.3 Section 35 LAA — Acknowledgement / Part Payment

10.3.1 The Plaintiffs may seek to argue that the partial payments ($6,554 and $19,561.74) constitute "part payment" of the larger debt that restarts time. But:

(a) part payment under s 35 generally requires acknowledgement of a debt, which presupposes a presently enforceable debt; (b) the payments were applied at the time of the relevant breach, and are not subsequent acknowledgements; and (c) the payments cannot be aggregated across years to revive years already statute-barred at the time of payment.

10.4 Strike-Out / Summary Judgment

10.4.1 UCPR r 171 — strike-out: unavailable to dispose of the entire pleading where there is a bona fide factual dispute; but available where the pleading discloses no reasonable cause of action, has no reasonable prospects of success, or is an abuse of process. Limitation can be addressed under r 171(1)(a)/(e): Wickstead v Browne (1992) 30 NSWLR 1; General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125.

10.4.2 UCPR r 292 — summary judgment: the test is whether the plaintiff has "no real prospect of succeeding on all or part of the claim" and there is "no need for a trial of the claim or part of the claim". Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo [2005] 2 Qd R 232; Coldham-Fussell v Commissioner of Taxation (2011) 82 ACSR 439.

10.4.3 Limitation can ground a strike-out where it is obvious on the face of the pleading: Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541.

10.4.4 Tactical caution: running a r 171 / r 292 application requires affidavit evidence and risks exposing our client's case prematurely. The fraud allegation is fact-rich and a court may decline to deal with it summarily. Recommend: file Defence first, then consider an interlocutory application after close of pleadings, when the fraud allegation has been particularised.

11. THE PLAINTIFFS' CASE — VULNERABILITIES SUMMARISED

11.1 The Plaintiffs face the following difficulties:

(a) The 6-year limitation period under s 27(2) LAA, running from no later than 30 June 2013, expired on 30 June 2019 — almost 7 years before proceedings were filed.

(b) Their fraud case must be specifically pleaded with particulars (UCPR r 150), and must reach the Armitage v Nurse threshold of subjective dishonesty — not merely irregular practice or breach of duty.

(c) Their case for present entitlement depends on trustee determinations which (on the present record) do not exist.

(d) Their proprietary tracing case is illusory — funds disbursed 13–22 years ago, intermingled, and distantly related (if at all) to a 2021 property held by a non-party.

(e) Their reasonable-diligence position is weak — they signed tax returns and paid tax on the very distributions they now say they did not receive.

(f) Michael's credibility is significantly compromised by inconsistencies between his affidavit and the SOC, and by his directorship.

(g) Forensic prejudice is acute — Megan deceased, Coomber unreachable, records gone.

11.2 The Plaintiffs' strongest cards are:

(a) the equitable narrative: they paid tax on money they did not receive — a powerful intuitive case; (b) the s 27(1)(a) "fraud" exception, if they can persuade the Court that the conduct was dishonest; (c) the bank statements (2006–2013) — primary documentary evidence of the payments to Alf and Megan; (d) ATO records corroborating their tax assessments.

12. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SCORECARD

Defence argument	Strength	Notes
s 27(2) — 6-year limitation	8/10	Subject only to s 27(1)(a) escape
Not s 27(1)(b) (trust property)	7/10	Money not held by Trustee; not converted to Trustee's use
Not fraud under s 27(1)(a)	6/10	Genuine risk; deploy Armitage v Nurse and reliance on Coomber
s 38 / discoverability against Plaintiffs	7/10	Annual tax returns kill reasonable-diligence argument
Laches / acquiescence / prejudice	7/10	Megan dead; Coomber gone; records gone
No valid trustee determination	7/10	Subject to deed; default-beneficiary clause is the trap
Personal not proprietary (limitation flow-on)	7/10	SOC self-characterises as compensation claim
Alf's personal liability — Williams v CBN	6/10	Class 2 constructive trustee — s 27 inapplicable to him
Michael's credibility / directorship	6/10	Useful collateral attack
s 76 Trusts Act 1973 (Qld) relief	5/10	Equitable safety valve
OVERALL DEFENCE MERIT	7/10	Solid but not bullet-proof
OVERALL RISK ASSESSMENT	5/10	Equity (in lay sense) is with Plaintiffs

13. STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS

13.1 Immediate Steps (Next 7 Days)

(a) File NOI by 29 May 2026 — non-negotiable. (b) Brief counsel — recommend senior junior with commercial equity / trusts expertise. Counsel should be briefed before any defence is finalised. Suggested instruction note to follow. (c) Forensic file note capturing the present state of evidence (deceased witness, lost records, bank statements held). (d) Document hold notice — confirm with Alf that all extant records are preserved.

13.2 Pre-Defence Steps

(a) Review the trust deed — full close-reading focused on: (i) determination clause(s); (ii) accumulation power; (iii) default beneficiary clause; (iv) definition of "income"; (v) variation power; (vi) provisions for trustee resolutions (form / time). (b) Locate David Coomber — engage a private investigator if necessary. He is a critical witness for both sides. We should obtain his evidence first. (c) Subpoena ANZ — for any pre-2006 records, application records on the Trust account, signature cards, and authorities — but only after Defence is filed (subpoena before defence will be premature absent leave). (d) Obtain the Plaintiffs' tax assessments — under FOI if necessary; or seek production from the Plaintiffs in lieu.

13.3 Defence — Drafting Approach

(a) Form 17 Defence — strict UCPR compliance. (b) Para-by-para response to each SOC allegation: admit / deny / non-admit, with direct explanations (UCPR r 166(4)) for every denial and reasonable inquiries for every non-admission (r 166(3)). No general traverses, no "strict proof" language. (c) Plead limitation under "Further Matters" with specific reference to s 27(2) LAA. (d) Plead in the alternative: (i) no valid determination; (ii) laches and acquiescence; (iii) s 76 Trusts Act 1973 (Qld) relief; (iv) set-off of tax benefits. (e) Particulars of (i) the absence of trustee resolutions; (ii) facts founding laches; (iii) conduct of Plaintiffs supporting acquiescence. (f) r 246 solicitor's certificate on the pleading. (g) Fraud allegation: if the SOC alleges fraud, scrutinise particulars. If insufficient, request further and better particulars before defending; if not provided, foreshadow strike-out application.

13.4 Interlocutory Strategy

(a) After close of pleadings, consider a r 292 summary judgment application on limitation — but only if the fraud allegation is poorly pleaded or evidentially weak. (b) Disclosure tactics: narrow the field; resist any attempt to convert the proceeding into a forensic accounting exercise across 22 years. Disclosure should be confined to: trust deed and amendments; bank statements 2004–2013; trust tax returns and accountant's working papers (if available); Plaintiffs' tax records. (c) Compulsory ADR: push for early mediation under UCPR Ch 9 Pt 4. The case has clear settlement potential given the tax-benefit set-off and the limitation risk on both sides.

13.5 Calderbank Strategy

(a) Notwithstanding the strength of the limitation defence, the residual fraud risk and the equitable narrative make this a case for an early Calderbank offer. Calderbank v Calderbank [1975] 3 All ER 333; UCPR r 361 (formal offers). (b) Suggested initial offer: a modest sum in full and final settlement, with each party to bear their own costs. The offer should be formulated only after counsel has advised, but the strategic concept should be on the table from the outset. (c) The Plaintiffs' costs exposure if they fail will be very significant given the scale of the claim.

13.6 Costs Strategy

(a) Costs of OA 698/26 — the 20 March 2026 Deputy Registrar's costs order needs to be reconciled. If costs were ordered against the Plaintiffs and remain unpaid, consider whether security for costs is available under UCPR r 670. (b) Security for costs (r 670 / r 671): the Plaintiffs are individuals. Security against individuals is rare and requires strong evidence of impecuniosity and that the proceeding is not the cause of the impecuniosity. Not a strong card in this matter.

13.7 Counsel

(a) Recommend briefing senior junior with experience in trusts and equity (Brisbane bar). Suggested levels: 10–15 years' call. (b) Brief should include: (i) this memorandum; (ii) the trust deed and constitution; (iii) the SOC; (iv) the OA 698/26 file (originating application, supporting affidavit, our response, costs order); (v) all available bank statements; (vi) ATO assessment summary (if obtained); (vii) Michael's affidavit; (viii) preliminary chronology. (c) Reference to senior counsel may be warranted if the matter does not settle and the s 27(1)(a) fraud point is to be litigated at trial.

14. CONCLUSION

14.1 The defence is, on present information, materially stronger than the claim — but not impregnable. The principal vulnerability is the s 27(1)(a) "fraud" exception, which the Plaintiffs will attempt to invoke to defeat limitation. A robust deployment of Armitage v Nurse, supported by Alf's reliance on Coomber, the open recording of distributions in tax returns, and the absence of concealment, is the centrepiece of our response.

14.2 The deeper structural defect in the Plaintiffs' case — the absence of any trustee determination giving rise to present entitlement — will require close construction of the deed but, if the deed is in conventional form, may be a complete answer.

14.3 The matter calls for early counsel involvement, careful interlocutory strategy, and a measured Calderbank offer to manage residual risk.

14.4 We recommend the immediate filing of the NOI and a planning conference with Mark Harley within 7 days to settle the defence strategy.

BossLawyerAI Boss Lawyers Pty Ltd Level 27, Santos Place, 32 Turbot Street, Brisbane QLD 4000

ANNEXURE A — CASE LIST (FULL CITATIONS)

Limitation / Trustee Liability

Armitage v Nurse [1998] Ch 241; [1997] 3 WLR 1046 (CA)

Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541

Cattley v Pollard [2006] EWHC 3130 (Ch); [2007] Ch 353

Doundoulakis v Constantinou [2010] NSWSC 622

Gwembe Valley Development Co Ltd v Koshy (No 3) [2003] EWCA Civ 1048; [2004] 1 BCLC 131

Hasler v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd (2014) 87 NSWLR 609

Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539

JJ Harrison (Properties) Ltd v Harrison [2002] 1 BCLC 162

Knox v Gye (1872) LR 5 HL 656

Magyar Sales (Aust) Pty Ltd v Magyar [2017] NSWSC 1469

Menegazzo v PricewaterhouseCoopers (Aust) [2016] QSC 94

Paragon Finance plc v DB Thakerar & Co [1999] 1 All ER 400 (CA)

Permanent Building Society (in liq) v Wheeler (1994) 11 WAR 187

Streeter v Western Areas Exploration Pty Ltd (No 2) (2011) 278 ALR 291

Thorne v Heard [1895] AC 495 (HL)

Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria [2014] UKSC 10; [2014] AC 1189

Equitable Compensation / Breach of Trust

AIB Group (UK) plc v Mark Redler & Co Solicitors [2014] UKSC 58; [2015] AC 1503

Bofinger v Kingsway Group Ltd (2009) 239 CLR 269

Brady v Stapleton (1952) 88 CLR 322

Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102

Heperu Pty Ltd v Belle (2009) 76 NSWLR 230

Re Dawson [1966] 2 NSWR 211

Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns [1996] AC 421

Target Holdings (Australia) Pty Ltd v DLTE Pty Ltd [2007] FCAFC 40

Youyang Pty Ltd v Minter Ellison Morris Fletcher (2003) 212 CLR 484

Knowing Receipt / Knowing Assistance / Barnes v Addy

Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244

Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89

Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) (2012) 200 FCR 296

Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan [1995] 2 AC 378

Trust Distributions / Present Entitlement

Colonial First State Investments Ltd v FCT (2011) 192 FCR 298

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Bamford (2010) 240 CLR 481

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Thomas (2018) 264 CLR 177

Harmer v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 173 CLR 264

Pearson v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2006) 232 ALR 55

Re BPTC Ltd (in liq) (No 3) (1992) 7 ACSR 291

Vacuum Oil Co Pty Ltd v Wiltshire (1945) 72 CLR 319

Equitable Defences / Laches

Crawley v Short [2009] NSWCA 410

Erlanger v New Sombrero Phosphate Co (1878) 3 App Cas 1218

Fitzgerald v Masters (1956) 95 CLR 420

Hourigan v Trustees, Executors & Agency Co Ltd (1934) 51 CLR 619

Lindsay Petroleum Co v Hurd (1874) LR 5 PC 221

Orr v Ford (1989) 167 CLR 316

Director / Corporate Liability

ASIC v Cassimatis (No 8) (2016) 336 ALR 209

ASIC v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345

Australian Securities Commission v AS Nominees Ltd (1995) 62 FCR 504

Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41

Hurley v BGH Nominees Pty Ltd (1982) 1 ACLC 387

Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission [1995] 2 AC 500

Re Macquarie Pacific Funding Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1247

Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22

Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153

Young v Murphy [1996] 1 VR 279

Pleadings / Fraud

Banque Commerciale SA v Akhil Holdings Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 279

Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No 3) [2003] 2 AC 1

Trustee Relief / Excuse

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd (2002) 41 ACSR 343

Re Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc (No 2) (2008) 237 CLR 66

Re Magarey Farlam Lawyers Trust Accounts (No 3) (2007) 96 SASR 337

Strike-Out / Summary Judgment

Coldham-Fussell v Commissioner of Taxation (2011) 82 ACSR 439

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo [2005] 2 Qd R 232

General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125

Wickstead v Browne (1992) 30 NSWLR 1

Signed Documents

L'Estrange v F Graucob Ltd [1934] 2 KB 394

Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165

Costs / Calderbank

Calderbank v Calderbank [1975] 3 All ER 333

ANNEXURE B — KEY LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), ss 5, 10, 27, 35, 38, 39, 43

Trusts Act 1973 (Qld), ss 76, 96 (and Trusts Act 2025 (Qld) equivalents from 28 April 2026)

Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld), s 58 (interest)

Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), Pt 2 (proportionate liability)

Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 6 (contribution)

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 180–184, 198F, 286, 290, 1317J

Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), ss 95, 97, 170

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), rr 137, 150, 166, 171, 246, 292, 361, 670–671

End of Memorandum.